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DUE PROCESS AT SENTENCING:
IMPLEMENTING THE RULE OF
UNITED STATES v. TUCKER
In United States v. Tucker,1 the Supreme Court held that a
criminal defendant's sentence is constitutionally invalid if its
length was enhanced by the sentencing court's consideration of
prior convictions that are later found unconstitutional under
Gideon v. Wainwright.2 In attempting to implement this rule, the
courts of appeals have not agreed on the proper procedures and
standards for a Tucker challenge to a sentence. This Comment
will discuss possible approaches to the three most troublesome
issues posed by Tucker: (1) the proper procedure for invalidating
a prior conviction under Gideon; (2) the proper standard for
determining whether a sentencing judge sufficiently relied upon
prior invalid convictions so as to require vacating the sentence;
(3) the proper remedy for a Tucker violation, once established.
Although the Tucker problem can theoretically arise in various
combinations of state and federal jurisdictions,3 this Comment
will discuss the problem only in the most recurrent context
-where a federal sentence is enhan-ced by consideration of in-
valid prior state convictions, and the federal prisoner challenges
his sentence in the federal court that sentenced him under 28
U.S.C. section 2255 (1970). 7
1 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
2 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Gideon held that a criminal defendant has a right to the
assistance of counsel at trial and that the states must provide counsel for indigents upon
request.
3 For example, the enhanced sentence may have been imposed by a state court, in
which case it must be challenged under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970), which requires prior
exhaustion of state remedies. Or, the allegedly invalid prior convictions may have been
federal, not state. These and other variations of the Tucker scenario will not be dis-
cussed herein.
4 The statute reads, in relevant part:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of
Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence
was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, ....
or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is
otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the
sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show
that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to
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I. HISTORY OF THE CASE
On May 20, 1953, Forrest S. Tucker was found guilty by a
California federal district court of armed robbery. He was sen-
tenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment, the maximum term
authorized by the federal statute.5 During the course of the trial,
the prosecution was permitted to ask Tucker on cross-exam-
ination for impeachment purposes whether he had any prior
felony convictions. Tucker admitted to three such convictions.
Several years later, the Superior Court of Alameda County,
California, conclusively determined in a collateral proceeding
that Tucker's 1938 conviction in Florida and his 1946 conviction
in Louisiana were invalid because in both cases he had not been
assisted by counsel and had not waived his right to such
assistance.
6
In 1969, Tucker filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. section
22551 requesting the sentencing district court to vacate the judg-
ment and set aside the sentence. The conviction was alleged to be
invalid under Burgett v. Texas" in that evidence of prior uncoun-
seled convictions was admitted for impeachment purposes. The
district court denied the motion, finding that, although admis-
sion of the evidence of the convictions was error, in light of the
overwhelming evidence of guilt the admission constituted harm-
less error under the standard of Chapman v. California.9
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's holding that the use of the evidence to impeach
the defendant's credibility was precluded by Burgett and ap-
proved the district court's finding that the error was "harmless
be served upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon,
determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with
respect thereto. If the court finds . . . that the sentence imposed was not au-
thorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been
such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to
render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and
set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him ...
or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.
5 See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (1970).
6 This decision is unreported, but its accuracy was accepted by the Supreme Court
in United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 445 n.2 (1972).
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). See note 4 supra.
8 389 U.S. 109 (1967). The Court held that the introduction of evidence of prior
uncounseled convictions for the purpose of supporting a conviction was reversible error.
In a much-quoted phrase the Court stated that "[tlo permit a conviction obtained in
violation of Gideon v. Wainwright to be used against a person either to support guilt or
enhance punishment for another offense .. . is to erode the principle of that case." Id.
at 115 (citation omitted).
9 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Under Chapman, before a constitutional error may be deemed
harmless, it must be shown that the error did not contribute to the verdict.
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beyond a reasonable doubt."'10 The appellate court went on to
find, however, that there existed "a reasonable probability that
the defective prior convictions may have led the trial court to
impose a heavier prison sentence than it otherwise would have
imposed. Therefore, as to the sentencing, we are unable to con-
clude that the reception of such evidence was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt."" Accordingly, the district court's refusal
to invalidate the conviction was affirmed but the case was
remanded for "resentencing without consideration of any
prior convictions which are invalid under Gideon v. Wain-
wright .... 1
Affirming the holding of the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme
Court elaborated on the rationale. The Court acknowledged that
under the federal judicial system a trial judge generally has great
latitude in sentencing and "may appropriately conduct an in-
quiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of
information he may consider, or the source from which it may
come."1 3 Furthermore, the Court agreed with the Government
that "a sentence imposed by a federal district judge, if within
statutory limits, is generally not subject to review.'
4
Notwithstanding its acknowledgment of wide judicial discre-
tion, the Court held that Tucker required a limiting of this sen-
tencing latitude for two reasons. First, the sentence was
"founded at least in part upon misinformation of constitutional
magnitude. . . . '[T]his prisoner was sentenced on the basis of
assumptions concerning his criminal record which were materi-
ally untrue'. "15 Secondly, as Burgett had noted, to allow such a
sentence to stand would erode the Gideon rule.' 6 The Court in
Burgett recognized that "since the defect in the prior conviction
was denial of the right to counsel, the accused in effect suffers
anew from the deprivation of the Sixth Amendment right."'
17
10 Tucker v. United States, 431 F.2d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1970).
1 1 1d. at 1294.
12 Id. (citation omitted).
'3 United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) (citation omitted).
14 Id. at 447. This dictum has become perhaps as important and noted as the ulti-
mate holding. It has been cited in numerous cases denying appellate review of sen-
tences. See, e.g., United States v. Glazer, 532 F.2d 224, 231 (2d Cir. 1976); United States
v. Wilkinson, 513 F.2d 227, 234 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Anderson, 466 F.2d
1361 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972).
1- 404 U.S. at 447 (quoting Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948)). The
Court further noted: "The record . . . makes evident that the sentencing judge gave
specific consideration to the respondent's previous convictions before imposing sentence
on him." Id.
16 Id. at 449.
1" Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967).
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In light of this reasoning, the Court asserted that whether
the outcome of Tucker's prior convictions would have been af-
fected by assistance of counsel was irrelevant. The relevant ques-
tion was instead whether Tucker's sentence "might have been
different if the sentencing judge had known that at least two of
the respondent's previous convictions had been unconstitution-
ally obtained."' 8 The Court concluded that "the factual circum-
stances of the respondent's background would have appeared in
a dramatically different light at the sentencing proceeding,"'19
had the trial judge known that Tucker's prison record reflected
unconstitutional confinement rather than valid convictions.
Furthermore, the Court disagreed with the Government's con-
tention that a "re-evaluation of the respondent's sentence by the
District Court . . . will be either 'artificial' or 'unrealistic'. '20 The
case was remanded to the trial court for "reconsideration" of the
sentence.
21
The Tucker rule that it is impermissible for a court to en-
hance a defendant's sentence on the basis of past convictions
which are unconstitutional under Gideon supports two observa-
tions about Tucker violations. First, the sentencing judge must
have explicit knowledge of the convictions which later prove to
be invalid for there to be a Tucker violation. Otherwise, he could
not be said to rely upon those convictions in his own sentencing
decision. A less obvious inference is that the sentencing judge
must be unaware of the constitutional invalidity of the prior
convictions. This inference stems from the Court's statement
that Tucker's record would not have had the same impact on the
trial judge had he known of the defects in the prior
convictions. 22 Tucker recognized that the judge's inquiry is
18 United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 448 (1972).
19Id.
11 Id. at 448-49. The Court stated that although the use of the convictions to sup-
port guilt was "harmless error," it did not necessarily follow that the judge, had he
known the true nature of respondent's record, would nonetheless have imposed the
maximum sentence. Furthermore, "[i]t would be equally callous to assume ... that the
trial judge will upon reconsideration 'undoubtedly' impose the same sentence he im-
posed in 1953." Id. at 449 n.8.
211 Id. at 449. For a discussion of the relative merits of reconsideration and resen-
tencing as remedies for a Tucker violation, see text accompanying notes 79-88 infra.
22 See text accompanying note 19 supra. Such an inference is also supported by
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), where the Court held that a sentencing
judge may consider relevant and reliable information of criminal activities of the de-
fendant even where he was never brought to trial. This rule has been extended to cases
in which the defendant was brought to trial and acquitted. See, e.g., United States v.
Sweig, 454 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1972). In United States v. Atkins, 480 F.2d 1223, 1224
(9th Cir. 1973), the Ninth Circuit asserted that "the mere fact that an invalid conviction
was obtained does not immunize the facts underlying this conviction from consideration
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"largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may
consider, or the source from which it may come. '23 Therefore a
sentencing judge may consider prior convictions and other evi-
dence of criminal activities. By the same token, however, his
assessment should be tempered by any knowledge of constitu-
tional violations involved in obtaining those convictions. As the
First Circuit stated in United States v. Sawaya,2 4 "Tucker does not
hold that sentencing judge may not be aware of prior convic-
tions, even constitutionally infirm ones. It holds only that the
court must be aware of the infirmities.
2 5
The second requirement for a Tucker violation is that the
sentencing judge's knowledge of the prior convictions might
have increased the length of the sentence. The possibility of a
sentencing judge's consideration of prior convictions in his own
decision is a necessary element of a Tucker violation. Whether the
standard of causation is the minimal "might have" standard or
some stricter standard is unresolved and will be discussed later in
further detail.
26
II. DETERMINING THE INVALIDITY OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS
In Tucker itself, the petitioner's prior Florida and Louisiana
convictions had been invalidated by a California court before he
brought his section 2255 motion. The Supreme Court was there-
fore not faced with the issue of whether federal courts must
require petitioners to have allegedly unconstitutional convictions
invalidated before filing Tucker petitions. In later cases, however,
petitioners have brought motions merely alleging that their prior
state convictions were invalid.27 The courts of appeals have dif-
fered in their treatment of such motions. The majority of the
circuits have allowed the federal judge in the district where the
motion is brought to hold a hearing to determine the validity of
the challenged convictions. 28 The rest of the circuits have re-
of the sentencing judge." But the court acknowledged that a sentencing court may not
give weight to such convictions without also considering the fact and effect of uncon-
stitutionality. Id.
23 404 U.S. at 446.
24 486 F.2d 890 (1st Cir. 1973).
2 5 Id. at 893.
26 See text accompanying notes 66-78 infra.
27 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fletcher v. Walters, 526 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1975);
Crovedi v. United States, 517 F.2d 541 (7th Cir. 1975); Wilson v. United States, 504
F.2d 59 (6th Cir. 1974); Wilsey v. United States, 496 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1974); United
States v. Sawaya, 486 F.2d 890 (1st Cir. 1973); Brown v. United States, 483 F.2d 116
(4th Cir. 1973); Lipscomb v. Clark, 468 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1972).
2
8 See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 528 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1976) (per curiam);
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quired the petitioner to invalidate each of the challenged convic-
tions in the state in which it occurred before a section 2255
motion will be entertained.29 Whether such a requirement
should be imposed depends upon the practical ramifications for
Tucker petitioners, for federal courts hearing section 2255 mo-
tions, and for state courts that imposed the now-challenged con-
victions.
A. Brown and the Prior Invalidation Requirement
The leading case requiring invalidation of the jurisdiction of
the prior conviction is Brown v. United States.30 In Brown, the
Fourth Circuit reasoned that a collateral proceeding should not
be premised upon a collateral attack on another conviction, par-
ticularly one imposed by a state court of foreign jurisdiction.
Otherwise, "a petitioner might use a collateral proceeding in
one jurisdiction to make 'a collateral second-level' attack on
judgments of convictions rendered in state courts in which there
had been not the slightest attempt at exhaustion of state
remedies." 31 The court further stated:
If the state conviction is in another state from that in
which the 2255 proceedings are had, the State procur-
ing the challenged conviction would not be a party to
the proceeding, would not have been heard on the in-
validation of its conviction, and would have been denied
the right to a prior exhaustion of state remedies as re-
quired under Section 2254(b), 28 U.S.C.
32
Practical efficiency also called for requiring each prior conviction
to be invalidated in the state that imposed it. The court stated
that "it can hardly be gainsaid that a more orderly and justiciable
review of the validity of a conviction can be afforded by the
sentencing court than by a court of a foreign jurisdiction ... 33
United States ex rel. Fletcher v. Walters, 526 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1975); Crovedi v. United
States, 517 F.2d 541 (7th Cir. 1975); Wilsey v. United States, 496 F.2d 619 (2d Cir.
1974); Leano v. United States, 494 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Sawaya,
486 F.2d 890 (1st Cir. 1973); Mitchell v. United States, 482 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1973).
29 See, e.g., Young v. United States, 485 F.2d 292 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 971 (1974); Brown v. United States, 483 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1973).
30 483 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1973). It is not clear whether the Fourth Circuit's rule
requires invalidation before the district court rules on the appropriateness of the sen-
tence, or merely before final relief can be granted. Compare Brown v. United States with
United States v. Dorman, 496 F.2d 438 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 945 (1974).
31 483 F.2d at 118.
32 Id. at 119.
3I1d. Mr. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972),
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The Fourth Circuit recognized that requiring invalidation
by the prior-conviction court was inconsistent with the procedure
that the circuit courts had ordinarily used when dealing with
recidivist or second-offender statutes. Recidivist statutes allow
the imposition of sentences beyond the ordinary maximum for
defendants with prior convictions of certain crimes. In cases in-
volving such sentencing procedures, the collateral-attack court is
generally permitted to determine the validity of the prior
convictions.3 4 The Brown court, however, distinguished these
cases on the grounds that the existence of prior valid convictions
was a necessary element of a recidivist or second-offender con-
viction that had to be proven by the prosecution. 35 The court
which held that the use of convictions that are invalid under Gideon to impeach a
defendant's credibility was reversible error, displayed the same concern. He wrote:
It is a sufficiently difficult task for a federal district court sitting in Texas
to review a Texas state criminal proceeding for constitutional error; in that
case the Texas state custodian himself is a defendant in the proceeding, all
counsel and the district judge are familiar with local Texas criminal procedure,
and the State and petitioners both have available such witnesses as may be
necessary to augment the record pertaining to the judgment under attack.
Whatever evidentiary hearing is held will take place in the general locale where
those witnesses who have knowledge of the earlier state proceedings are avail-
able to testify.
It is a good deal more difficult for the same Texas habeas court to make a
second-level collateral review of judgments of conviction rendered in the state
courts of Mississippi and Tennessee. The States that rendered the convictions
are not parties to the Texas habeas proceeding, and, of course, have no in-
terest whatever in sustaining the validity of sentences long since served.
Neither the Texas District Court nor Texas counsel can be expected to have
any familiarity with the vagaries of criminal procedure in Mississippi and Ten-
nessee. If there are any surviving witnesses to the actual court proceedings
which took place from 30 to 40 years ago, they are sufficiently distant from the
location of the Texas habeas court as to render their voluntary appearance
unlikely, and their compulsion by process impossible.
405 U.S. at 500.
34 E.g., Taylor v. United States, 472 F.2d 1178 (8th Cir. 1973); United States ex rel.
Lasky v. Lavallee, 472 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1973); Williams v. Coiner, 392 F.2d 210 (4th
Cir. 1968).
11 The court stated:
The very right of the Government to convict the defendant under these stat-
utes and to impose sentence thereunder is dependent on the ability of the state
to prove that there were constitutionally valid prior convictions. In such a con-
text, the defendant is manifestly entitled to be heard at the time in the trial
court on the constitutional validity of those prior convictions and the trial court
is obligated, as a condition to its exercise of power under the statute, to rule
whether the defendant has been previously sentenced under a constitutionally
valid conviction. . . . The Court cannot, in this posture of the case, stay the
prosecution until state remedies are exhausted; it must rule on the record of
conviction as it is offered in evidence. By the same token, when that conviction
is assailed later in post-conviction proceedings, it must be tested by the trial
record itself; and, since at trial no exhaustion of state remedies is required,
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pointed out that in most recidivist cases, the record of conviction
was silent as to the presence of counsel, thereby invoking a pre-
sumption of invalidity unless the state could affirmatively show
that the defendant waived counsel in the prior convictions. In
such cases, "the court is not invalidating the recidivist conviction
itself because the latter rests on evidence constitutionally invalid,
i.e., on a prior state conviction which on its face is void under
Gideon.
'
"36
The majority rationale in Brown was premised on considera-
tions of conserving judicial resources, practical efficiency, and
the distinction between Tucker cases and the ordinary recidivist
situation. The validity of each premise is questionable, however.
Judge Craven, dissenting in part in Brown, disagreed with the
majority's requirement of invalidation by the prior-conviction
court. First, he stated that to allow the collateral-attack court to
make the determination would in fact conserve judicial re-
sources. 37 The Fourth Circuit's rule would require the peti-
tioner to file collateral attacks in each state that had imposed a
challenged conviction. If successful, the petitioner would still
have to resort to the federal court hearing the section 2255 mo-
tion for the appropriate relief. "Moving a stack of petitions to
some other court," the dissent noted, "does not really advance
the judicial process. ' 38 Second, Judge Craven disputed the prac-
tical efficiency argument, pointing out that "[d]etermining the
presence of counsel is not a complex issue. '3 9 Finally, he stated
that the court's differentiation between recidivist and second-
offender cases on the one hand, and the usual Tucker cases on
the other was "a distinction but without a difference: enhanced
punishment rests upon a prior criminal record rendered void by
Gideon.'
'40
The distinction drawn by Brown between cases involving re-
similarly the post-conviction remedy does not require exhaustion.
483 F.2d at 121 (citations omitted).
36 Id. (footnote omitted).
31 Id. at 122 (Craven, J., dissenting).
38
/d.
39 Id. This opinion has been echoed by Mr. Justice Douglas: "The determination
whether a defendant had counsel at the time of prior convictions should ordinarily be
ascertainable from an examination of the records of conviction." Dorman v. United
States, 419 U.S. 945, 946 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
Where it is unclear whether- petitioner had a right to counsel under the circum-
stances, the Gideon question may not be capable of resolution on the face of the record.
See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); United States v. Sawaya, 486 F.2d 890,
892 (1st Cir. 1973).
40 483 F.2d at 123.
1118
UNITED STATES v. TUCKER
cidivist or second offender statutes and the ordinary Tucker situ-
ation is more of form than of substance. A recidivist statute is
more like a sentencing regulation than a substantive criminal
statute. In both the recidivist and Tucker cases, a prior conviction
is used to enhance the defendant's sentence. In both cases, the
underlying convictions are being challenged only as to their
present use for enhancement purposes. The original sentences
in these cases will probably have been served,41 and the states
that imposed them will have little interest in defending them.
Because of these similarities, courts may apply to Tucker situa-
tions the same sort of invalidation requirements used in re-
cidivist cases.
Courts dealing with recidivist sentences on collateral attack
have rejected the requirement of prior invalidation of state con-
victions by the same courts which imposed them. The Fifth Cir-
cuit in Craig v. Beto,42 citing Burgett v. Texas, 43 said that the sen-
tencing state "cannot disregard the constitutional infirmities of
any conviction which it seeks to use for enhancement pur-
poses. '44 The court found two reasons justifying challenges of
state convictions on federal collateral attack. First, a petitioner
would not have been serving the sentence but for the prior in-
valid conviction. Secondly, favorable results in the state courts
would still require a petitioner to return for further proceedings
in the federal court.45 In a statement as applicable to the usual
Tucker situation as to the recidivist case, the court said:
Since our decision only relates to the use of that
[Oklahoma] conviction in a Texas Court, it is only
necessary that Texas state remedies be exhausted. Our
action will leave standing the conviction in Oklahoma,
as far as Oklahoma is concerned, so that it is not neces-
sary for Craig to show that he has exhausted the post-
conviction remedies that might have been available in
that state.46
In Lipscomb v. Clark,47 the Fifth Circuit applied this rationale
to a non-recidivist situation and did not require the petitioner to
41 This would appear to be true because if the sentences had not been served,
petitioners would be eager to attack them in the jurisdictions which imposed them.
42 458 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1972).
43 389 U.S. 109 (1967); see note 8 supra.
44 458 F.2d at 1133.
45 Id. at 1134.
46
1d.
47 468 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1972).
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invalidate his prior convictions in state court. While recognizing
the factual distinction from the situation in Tucker itself, the
court stated:
The primary difference between the facts in Tucker
and this case is that in Tucker the unconstitutionality of
the prior convictions had been fully adjudicated in the
state courts. Here there is only Lipscomb's allegation
that the priors were obtained in violation of Gideon. The
Solicitor General did not find this distinction sufficient
to place this case outside the scope of Tucker. We
agree.
48
Accordingly, the court gave instructions that the district court
should hold evidentiary hearings and determine the constitu-
tionality of the petitioner's prior convictions.
49
Other circuits have rejected the Brown rationale and im-
plemented procedures similar to those used in recidivist cases for
authorizing federal district courts to determine the validity of
prior convictions. The Seventh. Circuit in Crovedi v. United
States,50 while recognizing "conceptual differences" between the
recidivist situation and the "collateral attack aspects" inherent in
a Tucker claim of enhancement of sentence because of considera-
tion of prior invalid convictions, nevertheless held that "the dif-
ferences are of insufficient magnitude for us to repudiate this
court's holding in Lufman that we are here dealing with a convic-
tion which, if unconstitutionally obtained, is infirm from its
incipiency."'51 The court accordingly remanded to the district
court to determine the validity of the prior convictions. 52
48 Id. at 1323. The Solicitor General had joined with Lipscomb's petition for cer-
tiorari which was ultimately denied in Lipscomb v. United States, 404 U.. 1021 (1972),
urging that the case be remanded to the district court in light of Tucker. Although the
Supreme Court also denied a petition for rehearing, 406 U.S. 911 (1972), the Fifth
Circuit took the opportunity to consider the claim in light of Tucker.
49 468 F.2d at 1323.
50 517 F.2d 541 (7th Cir. 1975).
5 1 Id. at 546. United States v. Lufman, 457 F.2d 156 (7th Cir. 1972), was a recidivist
case holding that if the petitioner challenges a prior conviction and the record is silent,
then the government must affirmatively show presence of counsel or explicit waiver of
the right to counsel.
52 All but two of the circuits apparently have assumed that the district court judge
has the power to decide the constitutionality of the prior convictions, and have merely
remanded the cases to the collateral-attack courts with instructions to do so. See, e.g.,
Wilsey v. United States, 496 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1974); Leano v. United States, 494 F.2d
361 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Sawaya, 486 F.2d 890 (1st Cir. 1973). The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia has never faced the Tucker issue directly and
the Tenth Circuit has rarely done so. In Martinez v. United States, 464 F.2d 1289 (10th
Cir. 1972), the Tenth Circuit, in a second-offender situation where the prior conviction
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B. Discarding the Requirement of Prior Invalidation
In addition to the reasons given by the Fifth and Seventh
Circuits for repudiating the Brown rationale of requiring prior
invalidation of state convictions, other policy considerations
favor the rejection of such a rule. The ability of the federal
courts to determine Gideon violations in past convictions, the par-
tial absence of justifications that underlie the normal exhaustion
of remedies requirement, 53 and the tremendous burden that the
rule would place upon petitioners call for its abandonment.
The determination of whether petitioner had counsel, as
Judge Craven stated, "is not a complex issue."'5 4 A foreign fed-
eral district court would be as qualified as a foreign state's lower
court to make such a review. Barring the impeachment of a
defendant's credibility through the use of prior convictions that
were invalid under Gideon, the Supreme Court in Loper v. Beto
5 5
strongly implied that the federal collateral-attack court could
properly determine the validity of prior convictions. The Court
reversed the district court's denial of relief, even though no state
court had ever ruled on the validity of petitioner's convictions.
The Court specifically noted that the validity of the challenged
convictions had not yet been conclusively determined below,
56
but remanded to the court of appeals without any instruction to
require state invalidation.
The policies ordinarily advanced for the requirement that
petitioners exhaust their available state remedies before proceed-
ing to a federal collateral-attack court are federal-state comity,
57
was facially invalid (marijuana tax law violation), remanded for resentencing without
consideration of the invalid sentence.
53 It should be noted that the exhaustion doctrine is directly related to the
Tucker-like situation in which the challenged sentence was imposed by a state court
rather than by a federal court. In that situation, which is not addressed in this Com-
ment, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970) expressly requires the exhaustion of available, effective
state remedies as a condition precedent to obtaining habeas corpus relief from the fed-
eral court.
.4 Brown v. United States, 483 F.2d 116, 122 (4th Cir. 1973) (Craven, J., dissenting
in part); see note 39 supra.
55 405 U.S. 473 (1972).
36 Id. at 479 n.6. Mr. Justice White, concurring, explicitly stated that the court of
appeals still needed to determine the validity of the prior conviction. Id. at 485. Mr.
Justice Rehnquist, in a sharp dissent, contended that the Court had failed to require
prior invalidation-a step he believed to be a prerequisite for habeas relief. Id. at
497-503.
5 7 See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 419-20 (1963), quoting Darr v. Burford, 339
U.S. 200, 204 (1950): "it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a
federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the
state courts to correct a constitutional violation ...." See also Rose v. Dickson, 327 F.2d
27, 28 (9th Cir. 1964).
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practical efficiency, 58 encouraging state participation in shaping
federal constitutional law, 59 and reducing the caseload burden of
the federal courts. 60 These justifications are not as compelling in
the Tucker context. Federal-state comity is not threatened by al-
lowing federal courts to determine the validity of prior convic-
tions because, as Mr. Justice Rehnquist observed, the states
which originally obtained the convictions "have no interest what-
ever in sustaining the validity of sentences long since served. 61
Nor would such a determination pose practical problems for
the federal courts, given the clear-cut standards for Gideon
violations. 62 An examination of the record would indicate
whether counsel was present for the defendant and whether
defendant had waived counsel. Moreover, because the Gideon
rule is so firmly established, requiring state courts to invalidate
their own convictions would not encourage state formulation of
federal constitutional law. State courts would simply be applying
a definitive test that leaves little room for substantive interpreta-
tion.
Nor would the litigation of such claims impose a tremen-
" See, e.g., Rose v. Dickson, 327 F.2d 27, 28 (9th Cir. 1964): "The issues presented
often concern local attorneys and court personnel, and arise in a context of local proce-
dures and practices, with which state courts are familiar. They may be resolved most
effectively by those tribunals."
59 See Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights:
Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L.
REv. 793, 830-31 (1965). Professor Amsterdam asserts that
leaving federal defensive issues to the state criminal courts in the first instance
gives those courts a promising opportunity for partnership in the administra-
tion of federal law. Hopefully, engagement in that partnership will cause the
state courts to look upon the developing register of federal protections to the
individual less as alien decrees imposed from distant Washington and more as
indispensable conditions for the integrity of local justice, for which they bear
responsibility.
60 The rationale is that some petitioners will be released by the state before reach-
ing federal court, or denied relief on adequate state grounds, or merely dissuaded from
pursuing further their remedies. Moreover, federal questions may be clarified and fac-
tual determinations made, relieving the federal courts of some of their workload. See
Amsterdam, supra note 59, at 831. See also Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 679-80 (1948),
noting that "any other rule would visit upon the federal courts an impossible burden,
forcing them to supervise the countless state criminal proceedings in which deprivations
of federal constitutional rights are alleged."
61 Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 500 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
62 See text accompanying note 54 supra. The ability of federal courts to determine
other constitutional violations in prior state convictions might be more questionable. For
example, in the event that the Tucker rule were held to apply to sentences relying on
prior convictions that were invalid under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a
more extensive fact-finding would be required to determine the constitutionality of
those convictions. Problems of retroactivity and harmless error complicate the applica-
tion of the Tucker rule to other due process contexts, and will not be addressed in this
Comment.
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dous burden on the federal courts. Petitioners' interest in attack-
ing underlying convictions will be limited to those situations
where such convictions have been used for enhancement pur-
poses. 63 The additional burden placed on federal courts by the
limited number of Tucker cases is certainly outweighed by the
tremendous burden which the prior invalidation rule would
place on petitioners.
Requiring prior invalidation interferes with the exercise of
the petitioner's constitutionally-mandated right to be resen-
tenced under Tucker. The effect of such a rule would reduce the
right to one in name only because the cost of obtaining relief
would often be prohibitive. 64 Where the underlying convictions
are alleged to be invalid under Gideon, it is likely that many of
the petitioners raising the issue will be indigent and unable to
afford the expenses involved in invalidating the prior convic-
tions. If a petitioner cannot afford counsel he will have to press
his attack by himself unless he is fortunate enough to be in a
state65 that provides free counsel to indigents in collateral pro-
ceedings. Even if he is not indigent, he may find the expenses
prohibitive. Furthermore, if any of the convicting states require
in-court appearances rather than the mere filing of papers, the
petitioner may have to obtain separate local counsel in each of
the jurisdictions. By contrast, only one attorney would be needed
if the federal collateral-attack court were permitted to rule on
the validity of the prior convictions. Another consideration of
fairness to the petitioner would compel the least circuitous
6 3 See text accompanying note 41 supra. The number of Tucker cases to date has
been quite small and appears to be decreasing, given the nearly universal application of
the Gideon rule today.
6' Several courts have indeed taken into account such humane considerations in
deciding not to require invalidation by the prior-conviction jurisdiction. In Mitchell v.
United States, 482 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1973), the court recognized that "[a] requirement
of exhaustion of collateral attack remedies in the state and federal courts where prior
convictions were obtained would erect an insuperable barrier to effective implementa-
tion of the Tucker rule." Id. The number of proceedings, the expenses and difficulties
involved in obtaining counsel, and the long delays would mean that "[e]xhaustion of the
movant, rather than exhaustion of other collateral attack possibilities, would be the
likely result." Id. at 294. The court concluded, "We do not believe Tucker contemplated
or is consistent with the creation of this type of procedural obstacle course." Id. In
United States ex rel. Fletcher v. Walters, 526 F.2d 359, 362 (3d Cir. 1975), the Third
Circuit echoed Mitchell in asserting that to require a petitioner to return to the states to
invalidate each of the challenged prior convictions "would be to erect a high barrier to
the effective vindication of his constitutional rights."
'5 A few states provide counsel to all indigents seeking post-conviction relief, and
many provide counsel at the discretion of the court. See, e.g., ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 122-4 (1973); OR. REv. STAT. § 138.590 (1975); Note, Prisoners' Rights-Access to Courts,
42 U. COLO. L. REv. 275, 289 (1970).
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method of relief. the delay in obtaining relief may be so long
that some of the unconstitutionally extended portion of the sen-
tence will have been served before relief can be granted.
III. FINDING A TUCKER VIOLATION
Just as the circuit courts have split on the question of which
jurisdiction may invalidate the prior convictions, so do they dis-
agree as to the standards for determining whether there has
been sufficient reliance on an invalid conviction for the Tucker
rule to apply. Two major approaches have been formulated: the
reasonable probability or harmless error approach, and the gen-
eral appropriateness test. In Tucker, the Supreme Court framed
the test by asking whether Tucker's sentence "might have been
different" had the sentencing judge known of the defects in the
prior convictions. 66 The court of appeals similarly observed that
the record showed "a reasonable probability that the defective
prior convictions may have led the trial court to impose a heavier
prison sentence than it otherwise would have imposed. There-
fore, as to the sentencing, we are unable to conclude that the
reception of such evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. ' 67 Both of these formulations appear to adopt the Su-
preme Court's general harmless error standard: the presentation
must "prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error com-
plained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. '68 The
strict harmless error test of reliance would therefore require the
invalidation of any sentence that might have been based upon
consideration of a prior invalid conviction.
The other major test which has been adopted more or less
by a majority of the circuits is the "general appropriateness" test
adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Lipscomb v. Clark.69 Under
Lipscomb, a district court hearing a Tucker petition must first de-
termine "if, treating the state convictions alleged to have been
unconstitutional as void and thus not to be considered in sen-
tencing, [the challenged sentence] would still be the appropriate
sentence based on the records of the trial and petitioner's ad-
66 404 U.S. at 448.
67 Tucker v. United States, 431 F.2d 1292, 1294 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 404 U.S. 443
(1972).
66 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). The Ninth Circuit has usually
applied this harmless error formula in alleged Tucker violations. E.g., Leano v. United
States, 494 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1974); see Dukes v. United States, 492 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir.
1974); United States v. Eidum, 474 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1973). But see Wilson v. United
States, 534 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1976).
69 468 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1972).
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justed conviction record. '70 If the sentence would still be ap-
propriate, the Tucker requirements are considered fulfilled, and
the petitioner's quest for relief is terminated. 71 If the sentence
would no longer be appropriate, the district court then conducts
an evidentiary hearing on the validity of the challenged prior
convictions. If they are found to be invalid, the court "may then
properly resentence" the petitioner.72 Thus, the Lipscomb
standard allows a sentence to stand if it can still be called "ap-
propriate," although the sentencing judge cannot say that con-
sideration of the invalid convictions was "harmless" beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Although this relatively permissive standard has been
adopted, with some variations, by several circuits73 it should be
rejected. Sentencing is a crucial step in the criminal adjudicatory
process-indeed, for the large numbers of defendants who plead
guilty74 it is the only step of any real consequence. The use of
the strict harmless error test best safeguards the due process
rights of defendants at this critical phase. When inadmissible
evidence is admitted at trial before either judge or jury, the
proper standard of review is harmless error.7 5 The same stan-
70 Id. at 1323.
71 Id. Although in Lipscomb the maximum sentence had been imposed, the court in
Russo v. United States, 470 F.2d 1357, 1359 (5th Cir. 1972) noted that a Tucker
petitioner's right to relief is not limited to cases in which the maximum sentence has
been imposed.
72 468 F.2d at 1323.
7E.g., Reynolds v. United States, 528 F.2d 461, 462 (6th Cir. 1976) (per curiam);
Crovedi v. United States, 517 F.2d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Sawaya,
486 F.2d 890, 893 (1st Cir. 1973); McAnulty v. United States, 469 F.2d 254, 255 (8th
Cir. 1972) (per curiam), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 949 (1973); cf. United States v. Radowitz,
507 F.2d 109, 112-13 (3d Cir. 1974) (affirming the district court's use of the Lipscomb
procedure and re-imposition of original sentence after reconsideration of challenged
sentence in light of alleged invalidity of prior state conviction); Hampton v. United
States, 504 F.2d 600, 604 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 917 (1975) (affirming
re-imposition of same sentence upon district court's reconsideration of challenged sen-
tence in light of alleged errors in presentence report's list of prior convictions). The
Eighth Circuit's adherence to Lipscomb may be wavering. See, e.g., James v. United
States, 476 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
"' See Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARV. L. REv.
821, 821 n.1 (1968).
"I The harmless error test that this Comment proposes be employed for finding
Tucker violations is referred to throughout as the "strict harmless error test" to distin-
guish it from other, less satisfactory harmless error tests that may currently exist. For
example, one commentator has suggested that there are three such tests. See Field,
Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error-A Process in Need of a Rationale,
125 U. PA. L. Rv. 15 (1976). One of them-the overwhelming evidence test-re-
sembles the Lipscomb general appropriateness test, and, for the reasons discussed in this
Comment, is unsatisfactory in the Tucker situation. This Comment adopts the more
traditional might-have-affected test as the "strict harmless error test."
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dard should apply when improper evidence is considered during
sentencing.
The general appropriateness test is unsuitable because it
fails to address the key issue underlying Tucker. The question is
not whether the sentence could have been the same without con-
sideration of the invalid convictions, but whether it would have.
The inequity produced by the general appropriateness standard
may be illustrated by a hypothetical situation. Suppose A and B
are found guilty in federal court of the same bank robbery. A is
sentenced to five years, while B is sentenced to ten years, the
judge noting on the record that B deserves a longer sentence
because of his "long string of state robbery convictions that show
his criminal depravity." Subsequently, all of B's state robbery
convictions are held invalid under Gideon, and B brings a Tucker
petition in the sentencing court. The judge finds no Tucker viola-
tion because, for whatever reasons he may set forth, he finds
that the ten-year sentence is still "appropriate" for B. Indeed, the
sentence may well be appropriate for B, in light of current
circumstances-perhaps B has boasted to prison officials about
the robberies he will commit when he is released, or perhaps
current sentencing practices would find a ten-year sentence to be
appropriate for a comparable bank robbery. But despite the ap-
propriateness of the sentence, B is still being treated unfairly. It
is obvious from the record that, but for the consideration of the
invalid robbery convictions, B would have received a five-year
term. The court considering the Tucker petition should strive to
eradicate the harmful effects of the Gideon violation and put B in
the same position as A, whose sentence was not enhanced by any
prior convictions.
Furthermore, even if the judge can honestly say that the
sentencing judge (normally himself) would have imposed the
ten-year sentence at the time of sentencing for reasons indepen-
dent of the prior invalid convictions (that is, finding that such a
sentence was "appropriate" even at the time of sentencing, de-
spite the Gideon violations), he should still find a Tucker violation.
Otherwise, the petitioner is in effect being forced to settle for a
mere reconsideration of his sentence. In light of the advantages
of resentencing over reconsideration, 76 the slight burden on the
courts, and the difficulty for even the same judge to say how he
would have sentenced in the absence of the invalid convictions, a
Tucker violation should be found whenever reliance on invalid
convictions is shown. The Lipscomb test, although easy to apply,
76 See text accompanying notes 79-88 infra.
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denies defendants the fairness that must be present in the vital
sentencing process. This general appropriateness test should be
rejected in favor of the strict harmless error test employed by the
Ninth Circuit in Tucker. Such a strict test is necessary to coun-
teract the harmful effects of the original Gideon violations.
One further issue must be addressed: the weight, if any, to
be given by a reviewing court to the sentencing judge's statement
that he did not rely on the challenged convictions in imposing
sentence. The reviewing court should simply apply the strict
harmless error rule and weigh the disclaimer along with the rest
of the record.77 The reviewing court should not take lightly the
sentencing judge's explicit disclaimer of reliance on invalid con-
victions, but neither should it give wide deference to such a
disclaimer. The reviewing court should independently scrutinize
the record in order to ascertain the rationale behind the sentenc-
ing decision. Where the record is devoid of any support for the
petitioner's contention that consideration of the prior convictions
enhanced his sentence, the disclaimer should suffice as grounds
for denial of relief. If there is any support for the petitioner's
position in the record, including the sentence itself and any
statements made by the judge during sentencing, then the re-
viewing court should decide whether the sentencing judge's con-
sideration of the defective convictions was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Of course, a trial judge's disclaimer made at
the time of sentencing should be accorded more weight than one
recited some time later.
Finally, in determining whether a Tucker violation has oc-
curred, the courts should bear in mind the words of the Third
Circuit: "Even though the statements of the sentencing judge do
not explicitly reveal his consideration of the invalid sentences, we
are of the opinion that the principles of Tucker are best effec-
tuated by resolving any doubts we might have on this issue in
favor of resentencing.
7 8
IV. REMEDY FOR A TUCKER VIOLATION
A. Substance of the Remedy: Reconsideration
or Resentencing?
The language of the Supreme Court in affirming the Ninth
Circuit's remand for resentencing in Tucker generated confusion
" Obviously, this solution is really applicable only in a reviewing court's assessment
of the sentencing judge's denial of relief, because if a judge disclaims reliance, he will
deny relief.
78 United States ex rel. Fletcher v. Walters, 526 F.2d 359, 364 (3d Cir. 1975).
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over the precise remedy required for a Tucker violation. The
Court spoke of both a "re-evaluation" 79 and a "reconsid-
eration"80 of Tucker's sentence. Furthermore, in a footnote, the
Court stated that "[i]t would be ... callous to assume, now that
the constitutional invalidity of the respondent's previous convic-
tions is clear, that the trial judge will upon reconsideration 'un-
doubtedly' impose the same sentence he imposed in 1953."81 As
a result of the Court's varying terminology, the lower courts
have sometimes accepted a mere reconsideration, rather than a
formal resentencing, to remedy Tucker violations.8 2
The first point to note about the less formal reconsideration
remedy is its similarity to the appropriateness doctrine. The use
of the appropriateness test may rest on either or both of two
rationales. First, appropriateness is a means of disclaiming re-
liance: if the sentence is appropriate, then the sentencing judge
could not have relied on invalid convictions in reaching his own
decision. Secondly, if the sentence is appropriate, then a success-
ful petitioner will merely have the same sentence re-imposed,
and it is unnecessary to proceed with a formal resentencing. The
theory of reconsideration is based upon this second rationale.
This theory posits that if, given the appropriateness of the sen-
tence, reconsideration would not warrant granting relief to a
petitioner, then he has no right to a formal resentencing.
Reconsideration is less satisfactory than resentencing for two
reasons. First, it lacks certain important procedural safeguards
that resentencing provides. Second, reconsideration is less likely
to result in thoroughly considered sentencing decisions than re-
sentencing. The procedural safeguards at sentencing, though
19 United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 448 (1972).
80 Id. at 449.81 Id. at 449 n.8.
2 See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 534 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1976); Hampton v.
United States, 504 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Simon, 488 F.2d 1094
(8th Cir. 1973) (per curiam), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 934 (1974). Such holdings have rested
on two similar premises. First, in response to the Supreme Court's rejection of the
assumption that the same sentence would be re-imposed on remand, United States v.
Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 449 n.8 (1972), the courts have reasoned that, when the sentenc-
ing judge has clearly announced that the sentence would not be changed, even without
consideration of the invalid convictions, then remand is clearly useless. See, e.g., United
States v. Simon, 488 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1973) (per curiam), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 934
(1974). Second, the courts have interpreted the Supreme Court's loose language to
mean that a formal resentencing may not be necessary. Consequently, the judge has
afforded an adequate remedy by his statement that he would not change the sentence.
See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 534 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1976). That the same sentence
is reimposed is not, of itself, undesirable; but the re-imposition of the same sentence
without the procedural safeguards and other benefits of a formal resentencing is to be
condemned. See text accompanying notes 83-88 infra.
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relatively few, are crucial to a defendant. The federal system
includes: the right of the defendant to be present at
resentencing; 83 the right to assistance of counsel, including
counsel's right to speak on behalf of the defendant; 84 and the
defendant's right to make a statement on his own behalf and to
present any information in mitigation of punishment. 85 The
defendant's right to speak allows him to present mitigating evi-
dence and, to a limited extent, to challenge damaging evidence.
In addition, it may be advantageous to the defendant if the
judge faces him while meting out punishment.86 The right to
counsel may be important in helping the defendant to utilize
effectively the above rights, as well as in advising him of addi-
tional steps to take or objections to make during sentencing.
The second major failing of reconsideration is that it does
not require the judge to address the problem of remedy as
thoroughly as he would in the resentencing process. Without the
procedural requirements and formality of the resentencing pro-
cess, a judge may fail to give the defendant the searching inquiry
and deep thought required in sentencing and will merely adhere
to his original sentencing decision. Furthermore, certain aspects
of the record may not be brought to the judge's attention if
petitioner and his counsel are not present. These deficiencies in
the reconsideration process may be aggravated in circuits that
follow the general appropriateness approach to Tucker viola-
tions,87 because in those jurisdictions the sentencing judge re-
views the sentence before deciding whether petitioner is entitled
to any relief. In such cases the judge may incline towards a less
rigorous review of the sentence than where the petitioner is al-
ready known to deserve some relief.
83 FED. R. CRiM. P. 43.
84 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(1). This right appears to be constitutionally required.
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing
for Felony, 81 HARV. L. REV. 821, 833-34 (1968).
85 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(1). In Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961),
the Court stated that the common-law right of allocution upon which Rule 32(a) is
based requires that a defendant, and not merely his counsel, be given an opportunity to
speak. But the failure of a trial court to ask a defendant represented by an attorney
whether he wished to speak before sentence was imposed has been held not to be a per
se constitutional violation of fundamental fairness that may be challenged under a writ
of habeas corpus. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962). For a discussion of
the common-law origin of the defendant's right to be present at sentencing and to
speak on his own behalf, see Barrett, Allocution, 9 Mo. L. REv. 115, 232 (1944). See also
Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 1292, 1295, 1307, 1317 (1964); Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d (Supp.) 369,
372 (1976).
86 Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARV. L. REv. 821,
831 (1968).
87 See note 73 supra.
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Because reconsideration fails to safeguard a petitioner's
rights as fully as resentencing, reconsideration is an inadequate
remedy for a Tucker violation. Sentencing, as discussed previ-
ously, is a critical stage of the criminal proceeding. The defen-
dant is therefore entitled to the same type and degree of protec-
tions afforded at the trial itself.88 By comparison, when a verdict
is invalidated, a judge or jury is not asked to state whether the
petitioner would still be found guilty in light of the legal defi-
ciency of the trial. A full retrial with all of its formal procedures
is required. The same should certainly be true of sentencing-a
stage that is crucial to the defendant and not nearly as burden-
some on the court as a trial. When a sentence is vacated and the
strict harmless error standard is not met, resentencing or its
equivalent should be required.
B. Requiring a New Judge for Resentencing
If the appropriate remedy for a Tucker violation is a full-
blown resentencing rather than a mere reconsideration of the
original sentence, the issue remains whether a new judge should
be required for resentencing. If the strict harmless error rule is
to be applied, it is clearly advantageous for the original Tucker
petition to be brought before the federal sentencing judge. Al-
though some dangers may inhere in this procedure, he is in the
best position to evaluate whether he relied on the invalid state
convictions. 89 He may also disclaim reliance and deny relief, how-
ever, forcing the Tucker petitioner to turn to a court of appeals.
If the court of appeals then reverses a denial of relief based on its
own examination of the record, the case should be remanded
to a different judge for resentencing to permit the fairest assess-
ment of an appropriate sentence untainted by consideration of
a constitutionally infirm conviction.
In O'Shea v. United States9" the First Circuit was faced with a
Tucker situation and remanded to the original sentencing judge.
The court deviated from its usual practice of remanding cases
(in non-Tucker situations) to new judges for resentencing. 9' The
8 See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967); Note, Procedural Due Process at
Judicial Sentencingfor Felony, 81 HARV. L. REv. 821, 821 n.1 (1968).
89 See text accompanying note 95 infra.
90 491 F.2d 774 (1st Cir. 1974).
91 E.g., United States v. Bishop, 469 F.2d 1337, 1348 (1st Cir. 1972); United States
v. Picard, 464 F.2d 215, 220 (1st Cir. 1972); Mawson v. United States, 463 F.2d 29, 31
(1st Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
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court first noted that familiarity with the case is relevant to ap-
propriate sentencing, and that for a new judge to familiarize
himself with the case would be wasteful.92 The court then articu-
lated the distinction between the Tucker situation and other re-
sentencings. Reasoning that the original judge will have unique
knowledge of relevant facts and will know how much weight he
gave to the prior convictions, the court observed that "[i]f the
issue is what would the defendant's original sentence have been
if . . . the presentence report had been appropriately limited
[i.e., did not contain information of the invalid prior conviction],
which, optimally is what the issue should be, no one but the
original judge could normally answer that question.
93
The court implicitly acknowledged that the function of the
court hearing the Tucker petition was not merely to evaluate the
appropriateness of the original sentence, declaring that "[i]f the
issue were simply what would be an appropriate sentence on the
revised record, a different judge could address the question
. . ,,9' Reliance on a prior invalid conviction was instead
the foremost issue to be determined by the court. Because the
sentencing judge obviously knows the considerations behind
his decision, he may conclude whether reliance did occur, thus
entitling the petitioner to relief if the prior conviction is found to
be invalid.
This procedure nevertheless generates some risks that were
perceived in a different, but analogous, context by Judge Huf-
stedler of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, dissenting in Wil-
son v. United States.95 Addressing the issue of how much weight to
give to a sentencing judge's disclaimer of reliance on certain
factors, she recommended that cases involving Tucker violations
be remanded to a new judge for resentencing. She argued that
to ask the sentencing judge to reconsider his original decision
called upon him "to undertake the intellectual gymnastics of try-
ing to decide how he would have sentenced if he had known that
he could not consider some of the information that he had ear-
lier taken into account." Furthermore, even if the judge could
perform such "gymnastics," Judge Hufstedler found such a pro-
cedure faulty because it would be "perceived as unfair." Finally,
she concluded that 'judges are susceptible to that frailty of
92 491 F.2d at 779.
9 3 Id.
9' Id. (emphasis in original).
9-1534 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1976).
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human-kind to stick to a judgment, once uttered, even when
later shown that it was wrong.
96
The O'Shea rationale does provide a justification for initially
requiring the petitioner to present his motion to the sentencing
judge whenever possible. But because of the reasons pointed out
by Judge Hufstedler, a reviewing court should not be overly
deferential to the sentencing judge's disclaimer. One potential
problem is that district judges will routinely find a Tucker viola-
tion, but then, just as routinely, reimpose the original sentence.
To forestall such a practice, the courts of appeals might require
the district judges to announce reasons for not reducing such
sentences. If the routine reimpositions persist, the courts of ap-
peals should remand Tucker petitions to a judge other than the
original sentencing judge.
The O'Shea rationale seems less applicable, however, where
the sentencing judge has denied petitioner's motion on the
ground that he did not rely on the allegedly improper informa-
tion in imposing the original sentence and the court of appeals
has reversed, finding a reasonable probability of reliance. In
such a case, whatever benefit is to be derived from the sentenc-
ing judge's familiarity with the case and with the reasons for his
original sentencing decision have already been derived. Conse-
quently, nothing will be gained by remanding to him for resen-
tencing. Considerations of fairness mandate that such a case be
remanded to a new judge for resentencing.
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has examined the Tucker rule, and has pro-
posed certain procedures for its implementation. The discussion
has considered the proper procedures for cases in which a fed-
eral sentence is increased by consideration of prior state convic-
tions that are invalid under Gideon v. Wainwright.97 In summary,
the suggested Tucker procedure is as follows:
(1) The initial petition alleging that a federal sentencing
96 Id. at 138 (citations omitted) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). Although no other court
has explicitly considered the question in the Tucker context, several courts have, in other
contexts, followed the First Circuit's practice of remanding cases to different judges for
resentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Hammerman, 528 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Huff, 512 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Schwarz, 500 F.2d
1350 (2d Cir. 1974) (per curiam); United States v. Vale, 496 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1974);
cf. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (if resentencing were found, on re-
mand, to be appropriate remedy for prosecutorial misconduct in breaching agreement
not to make sentencing recommendation, resentencing should be by a different judge).
97 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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judge relied upon a prior invalid state conviction should be pre-
sented to the original sentencing judge whenever practicable,
without any requirement of prior invalidation of the, allegedly
invalid convictions and without any requirement that those con-
victions be invalidated in the states imposing them.
(2) The judge hearing the petition should apply a strict
harmless error test (rather than a general appropriateness test)
to determine whether the sentencing judge (including himself)
relied on the allegedly invalid state convictions in imposing the
federal sentence.
(3) If the judge determines beyond a reasonable doubt that
consideration of the prior state convictions did not affect the
federal sentence, he should deny the Tucker petition. Otherwise,
he should hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the validity
of the prior state convictions. (Alternatively, he may rule on the
validity of those convictions before proceeding to the reliance
inquiry.)
(4) If any of the prior state convictions is determined to be
invalid, the petitioner should be afforded a full resentencing.
(5) A court of appeals reviewing a denial of a Tucker petition
by the original sentencing judge should assess that judge's deci-
sion in light of the record, using a strict harmless error test.
(6) If the court of appeals concludes that the allegedly in-
valid state convictions might have affected the original sentence,
the case should be remanded to a judge other than the original
sentencing judge for an evidentiary hearing on the validity of
the prior convictions, and for a full resentencing, if warranted.
In some cases the invalidity of the state convictions will appear
on the face of the record, in which case the remand will be for
resentencing only.
The use of such procedures will help to insure that a crimi-
nal defendant will not be additionally penalized because of un-
constitutionally obtained convictions.
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